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FOREWORD
This is Volume II of a four-volume report. Volumes III and IV will
be available after 1 October 1967. This volume reflects the results of the
first six-months study. It was conducted to determine the adequacy of basic
Apollo equipment for manned interplanetary spacecraft and determine the
most effective method of providing long-duration mission assurance.
The characteristics of several subsystems resulted in their elimination
from further consideration. In these instances, subsystem configurations
already proposed for similar missions were sflbstituted. Subsystem
evaluation for this phase of the study effort consisted of reliability]system
effectiveness analyses augmented by RECOMP mission simulation, which
resulted in quantitative estimates of mission reliability and definition of
equipment areas where reliability is inadequate for manned interplanetary
travel.
The study was conducted during the first half of CFY 1967 by the Systems
Engineering Management Division of the Space and Information Systems
Division of North American Aviation, Inc. , under Research Authorizations
(RA) 02195 - 15400 and 02195 - 15100. Documentation of the study is con-
tracted under NAS2-4214, by the Mission Analysis Division, NASA/OART,
Ames Research Center, Moffett Field, California.
The work was performed under the direction of Roy B. Carpenter, Jr.,
the program manager, Advanced Operations Analysis, Systems Engineering
Management. Substantial contributions were made by H. L." Steverson,
R.F. Wadsworth, L.K. Relyea, E.M. Murad, $.P. Goggins, J.A. Roebuck
and I. Streimer.
NOTE: The "'Background" and "Requirements for Maintenance" sections from
Volume 1 have been included here to establish continuity of thought and to
assure a proper understanding of the problem with which this study is concerned.
Because extended, manned, earth orbital and interplanetary flights
pose a challenge to the nation's technological capability, reasonable assur-
ance of mission success and crew safety is a basic prerequisite to these
flights. It is self-evident that a need exists to create an integrated design
and operational concept that will yield the desired safety assurance, and yet
be feasible, economical, and acceptable to engineering and management.
However, the no-failure-allowed approach to achieving mission assurance
is unrealistic for the longer manned missions within the 1970-1980 period.
iii
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Since the ability to improve mission success has already been demonstrated,
the demand has grown for a long-mission-duration manned spacecraft design
that will make maximum use of both man and machine. Thus it is evident
that the concept should include man as a maintenance expert, a trouble antici-
pating sensor, a backup operator, a backup computer, and perhaps other
functions as yet undefined. In sum, such an approach is embodied in the
availability concept.
This concept, originally applied to ground electronic systems, has been
developed under a prior study for application to manned space missions,
under a design and analysis technique deriving an optimum man-machine-
mission relationship. It assures the required operational availability of
spacecraft system functions while remaining within the constraints imposed
by the crew, equipment, and mission commitments. The concept requires
that the crew shall recognize degraded performance, isolate its cause, and
perform the required maintenance action.
The maintenance aspect of the concept has been the subject of several
former studies conducted at S&ID which indicate that man, given adequate
preparation, can probably perform the required activities. Indications are
that the maintenance workload would not exert a pronounced influence on
crew utilization and it appears that the maintenance requirements can be
identified with reasonable accuracy. Uncertainty relating to failure rates
imposes a small weight penalty in increased spares, and its effect appears
to be well below that of the uncertainty in propellant requirements.
The Apollo spacecraft or its subsystems were not specifically designed
to facilitate in-flight maintenance. But they do represent what may be con-
sidered the 1970 technology. Apollo subsystems were used as the study
baseline, as modified by the flyby mission requirement. Commonality of
functions of primary, or crew-sensitive spacecraft systems ':_"for diverse
missions (planetary, lunar, or orbital) makes it reasonable to assume that
the system components would be similar, if not interchangeable, for a given
time period such as the 1970's or 1980's. In addition, the development
problems associated with new designs for each new mission make such a
philosophy unattractive because of both cost and risk.
The extended-mission Apollo represents the best contemporary source
of detailed system design data upon which to base the proposed study. These
data, in conjunction with the configurations established in the Mars/Venus
Flyby Study (Ref. I. l), provide the basis for the mission and systems for the
planetary mission module. The planetary, lunar landing modules and earth
recovery modules are expected to use the same system components, but the
*A syste,n wherein loss of function would be deleterious to the crew.
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need for maintainability is less crucial because of the relatively short duty
cycles. By application of the same reasoning, the Apollo Extension Systems
(Ref. 1.2) form a realistic base for the extended earth-orbital and lunar
missions. (See Volume I.)
The study was conducted in three phases. Phase I identifies the main-
tenance problem in terms of expected requirements and constraints; Phase II
will include design sensitivity, and the required trade-off analysis; and
Phase III will analyze the effects on spacecraft design and establish a mission
system description as it applies to the reliability and crew safety problems.
S&ID has studied for several years reliability problems associated with
extended manned space travel--a portion of the work being accomplished under
NASA contracts (Refs. I. i, 1.2, 1.3 and 1.4), and in addition, S&ID, through
company-sponsored studies, has continued these efforts. These, in con-
junction with the Apollo Program and its extension studies, have provided
for the time period of interest a wealth of data on the reliability/crew safety
aspects of manned spacecraft. (See Volume l.)
As shown in Figure 1. l, the data indicates that, during the next decade,
it will be impractical to attempt design of a spacecraft for maintenance=free
operations for missions in excess of about 45 days. The practical mission
limits for a non-maintainable design for a manned spacecraft probably vary
between 30 to 45 days, depending on the mission profile and objectives. As
missions are extended in duration and the abort profiles become more com-
,I
plex and time consuming, equipment failure becomes virtually certain.
Further, a point is reached where adding redundancy no longer compensates
for potential failures, but rather adds to the failure hazard. This technology
limit is created by the need to include switching devices, performance
monitors and voting circuits, as well as the connections to the system in the
function reliability assessment. The practical limit seems to be between
one and two additional components in simple redundancy. Maintenance
beyond this point must be considered as a more reasonable alternative
(Vol. l).
This study is concerned with mission durations measured in years.
The approximate mission reliability requirements in terms of mean time
before failure (MTBF) without maintenance are:
I. Venus Flyby
2. Mars Flyby
20 to 100 x 104 hours
20 to 1000 x 104 hours
3. Mars Landing 20 to 600 x 104 hours
- V -
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The state-of-the-art capability has been shown (Ref. I. i) to be as
follow s:
le
2.
Without redundancy, approximately 0. 1 to I. 0 x 104 hours
With optimum redundancy, approximately i. 0 to 5. 0 x 104 hours.
If no failures are to be tolerated these estimates obviously fall far
short of the expressed requirements, literally by orders of magnitude.
Further, this same study indicated that, on the average, system MTBF can
be improved by factors of between 5 and 10 over any decade. The effect of
applying those systems to the longer space missions are demonstrated in
Figure I. l, where a state-of-art spacecraft is applied to the missions of
interest without programmed maintenance.
Clearly, the longer missions must be prepared for failures. At this
point, some study results have suggested that a possible alternative would
include abort, spacecraft replacement, escape capsules, or rescue. But,
S&ID studies have shown that, for the planetary and most lunar area missions,
none of these will assure crew curvival (Refs, i. l, and I. 5). These are
reviewed later in this study report and shown to be ineffective. Conversely,
provision for even the simplest of maintenance provides very startling
results in terms of increases in mission success and crew survival (Vol. l).
For example, the typical state-of-the-art spacecraft MTBF is
estimated to be about 2800 hours. Now, assume that the mission duration is
about 400 hours. Without any repair the probability of mission success (no
failure) is only:
40O
R = e-_
28OO
= 0.870
By making provisions for just one repair, reliability, R, is increased to _t
least:
or
0.933 at the lower boundry
0.990 at the upper boundary,
depending on the assumed distribution, the method of calculation, and ho\\
the provision for the repair was implemented. Adding provisions for one
- vi -
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more repair (in the critical system), or a total of two, raises the lower
boundary estimate for mission reliability, R, to more than 0.99. These
data indicate that providing for maintenance for the longer missions pos-
sesses a very attractive potential for increasing probability of mission
success. Further, this is one case where the mathematics present a very
conservative picture of the actual gains derived. This effect is dramatically
shown in Figure 1-2 which presents an estimate of mission reliability as a
function of mission duration and spares application. The lower curve, the
baseline spacecraft, is representative of the latest AES reliability estimates
derived from Apollo data. The curves above the base spacecraft represent
the effects of adding one spare to the previous state for replacement of a
critical component in the listed system. Note that a marked effect on mission
reliability is achieved by adding only three spares. (See Volume 1. )
The effects of sparing on the probability of safe return are not as
dramatic for many earth orbital missions because of the abort capability.
However, for. the extended lunar and planetary missions, the results of
M&R actions are essentially the same as shown for mission success. This
condition prevails because of the abort criteria applied to the Apollo missions
and the very high initial probability of crew survival. But, as the missions
are extended in distance away from the earth, the abort time delay exercises
an increasingly more significant influence on the survival characteristics of
a nonmaintainable manned spacecraft design.
From the foregoing, it is evident that a few spares and the associated
M&R actions have a profound effect on both missions safety and success.
The next most natural question is how many M&R actions are required to
achieve a reasonable level of safety for the missions of interest? This is
actually a major subject of the study. However, the number was estimated
in Ref. 1.1. Using the prior estimated spacecraft MTBF, the number of
M&R actions to be prepared for can be calculated as a function of the risk
to be taken in meeting the need.
Since we are dealing with a statistical problem the answer will be
statistical in nature; if the mission risk or reliability is to be 0.95, this
means that a 5-percent risk of not having the required part for a failure
is acceptable. In Figure 1. 3, the number of M&R actions to be prepared
for has been estimated for the state-f0-the-art spacecraft, as a function of
mission duration and acceptable risk. With only a 5-percent risk, less
than 85 M&R actions need be expected. Thus, this adds up to less than one
activity per week of mission time, a very modest workload indeed. A basic
intention of this study is to identify which specific components in a typical
contemporary spacecraft will require attention and in what form. (Volume 1.)
- vii -
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In the past, maintenance has often been accomplished despite the
design, rather than as a result of designing for maintenance. But now, crew
safety, political, and cost aspects make it mandatory to take advantage of the
potential reduction in risk inherent in the maintainable design. Since in-flight
maintenance is dependent, to a large extent, on an amenable system configur-
ation and hardware, full consideration must be given to the design for
maintenance at the onset of the program. Thus, in-flight maintenance
becomes an integral part of system design, and requires coordination with
the concerned disciplines such as engineering, reliability, human factors,
maintainability, logistics, and operations analysis. This systems approach
has led to the availability concept detailed in Ref. I. 6 (Volume l).
- viii -
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i. INTRODUCTION AND SUMMARY
SUMMARY OF RESULTS
This volume of the report contains the results of initial analyses con-
ducted to determine the capability of subsystems to function on a Mars
mission; the results of a computer simulation program conducted in conjunc-
tion with the analyses; and definition of problem areas requiring additional
investigation. The basic mission timeline and equipment operating require-
ments are duplicated from Volume I and are used in the analyses contained
in Section 2. Sections 3 through 9 contain discussions of individual subsystems.
Potential problem areas and future study recommendations are in Section 10.
Results of analyses, as reflected in this volume, indicate that in
general, the inherent reliability of the subsystems as now defined will not
provide adequate assurance of mission success even with optimum redundancy.
The combined electronics consisting of stabilization and control, communi-
cations, and guidance and navigation, result in an estimated reliability of
30 percent for the Mars Flyby Mission. This constitutes about a 68-percent
contribution to total vehicle unreliability. Volumes III and IV reflect the
results achieved by redesign, sparing, or in-flight maintenance. The major
contributors to these low values are: 1. G&N Optics (G&N Subsystem),
2. SCS Attitude Electronics {SCS subsystem), 3. CDC (G&N, and 4. Star
T racker ( Communications}.
The overall inherent mission reliability for the Mars Flyby Mission
Vehicle has been shown to be no better than 21 percent after optimizing
redundancy and operational utilization. The approximate percent of
unreliability contributed by the subsystems is provided in Table I-i. This
represents an increase in the probability of crew safety from about 0.03 to
0.21 through optimizing mission and systems design and yet without mainte-
nance or repair.
STUDY OBJECTIVES
This study is being conducted in conjunction with and in support of the
Manned Mars Flyby study NAS8-18025. The objectives covered in this volume
are: {I) to determine the speclhc increases in system effectiveness/reliability
of Apollo type equipments required for lunar and interplanetary missions of
up to 700 days in duration; and {2} to define methods for achieving the required
increases. The tasks covered in this volume are: {I) to define mission
requirements and constraints, including mission timeline timelines, mission
- 1 -
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functional tasks, equipment operating requirements, down-time constraints,
and abort criteria; (2) to conduct a contingency analysis in which alternate
operating modes are considered; and (3) to conduct mission modeling and
analysis by means of a RECOMP II program developed to provide quantitative
reliability predictions and define areas/items contributing most to unreliability.
Table i-I. Overall Inherent Mission Reliability
Sub sys tern
Electronics
ECS /LSS
SPS
Spin Engine
Remainder
Vehicle Reliability
Percent Reliability
30.0
85.0
9O.O
95.0
97. O
Zi.0
Percent Contribution
To Vehicle Unreliability
68.0
14.5
i0.0
5.0
2.5
i00.0
Approach: Since the baseline subsystems reflected Apollo equipment,
and since a certain form of logic representing these subsystems was
required for computer simulation, reliability block diagrams representing
Apollo BlocklI configurations were developed. The Apollo environmental
control/life support and the electrical power subsysten_s obviously are
inadequate for the longer missions; therefore configurations proposed by
the design groups supporting the study effort were used. Apollo subsystem
logic differs depending on whether the criterion employed applies to mission
success or crew safety. For example, two units, either of which is
essential to system operation, would be represented in a series arrange-
ment for mission success, since failure of either one would necessitate an
abort. Crew safety logic would represent the units in parallel, since, in
the event of oue failure, the other unit would be available for system
operation. In the case of a Niars mission, this criterion would apply up to
Mars trajectory injection, since the mission could be aborted up to that
point. After injection into a Mars trajectory, however, the AV requirements
for abort exceed the capability of the on-board propulsion units, and abort,
in effect, requires a Mars flyby and return. Crew safety logic was therefore
used in evaluating the inherent reliability of subsystems after injection into
the Mars trajectory. In the event of equipment failure, reliance must be
placed on the redundant units, alternate operating modes, repair capability,
or a combination of all three.
It is recognized that certain failures may cause curtailment of
scientific experiments and impairment of mission objectives; however, the
SID 67-478-2
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probability of such failures and the effect of these failures on the planned
scientific workload is a subject for future study.
As an ancillary task to the subsystem reliability evaluation, each
mission function was examined from the aspect of criticality and alternate
equipment use. Mission success, defined as the accomplishment of all
objectives with safety for the crew was considered in determining the
dependence on the individual functions. A summary of this evaluation is
contained in Appendix A.
- 3-
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F_ECEDING PAGE BLANK NOT r_.r,.',_,---'-
Z. MISSION TIMELINES
Tables Z-l, Z-Z, and 2-3 define the details of the mission timelines
used as a reference for subsystem analyses. The total mission consists
of 16,801.2 hours. The first three tables contain subsystem operating/
cyclic requirements for the twelve basic mission phases. The two longest
phases, consisting of transit to Mars and return, have been further
subdivided into second-level phases. They are shown on the fourth and
fifth table s.
-5-
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3. SPIN ENGINE SUBSYSTEM
FUNCTION
A mission requirement providing for biological stability is that the
entire spacecraft must be spinning during the long transplanetary coast
periods. Prolonged exposure to zero g environment causes undesirable
chemical changes within man, with the effect of progressive weakness.
Prevention of this debility can be accomplished by imparting rotation to the
vehicle in the extended configuration and thus creating an artificial gravity
acceleration.
Energy for spin-up and de-spin is provided by a spin engine subsystem
using directed products of combustion to increase and decrease rotation.
Figure 3-I contains a subsystem schematic. A list of major components is
provided. The current method requires spinning of the spacecraft in a mated
condition, then extending and increasing speed of rotation until astronaut
comfort is achieved. De-spin would be the reverse procedure and is
absolutely required to accomplish midcourse correction, planetary encounter
operations, and reentry corrider establishment.
DEFINITION OF DUTY CYCLES
Thrust is required for one burn cycle at each extension and retraction.
The direction is predetermined: no gimballing is required. The time period
depends on the spacecraft and engine sizes and can vary over a wide range.
Valve timing is not critical because the engine{s) can be started at manual
command, left operating for long periods, and shutdown when acceptable
spin is achieved within wide tolerances.
Although thrusting occurs only occasionally during the flight, most of
the system is required to prevent propellant and pressurization fluid loss at
all times. The system is entirely filled with propellants from the initial
extension immediately after transplanetary injection. Leakage at any point
would degrade subsequent operation in the ability to cope with the require-
ments of emergency use. It is expected that redundant sets of propellant
containers will be on board; so that the capability of mission completion
will be retained despite an individual loss.
-15-
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Figure 3-I. Spin Engine Subsystem Schematic
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The following duty cycle has been taken from the mission timeline
previously presented:
Phase 3. 1 through 3.4 Propellant storage throughout
24 hour s
Phase 3. 5 Propellant storage throughout
48 hours
Phase 3.6 Propellant storage through
O. 7 hours
Phase 3. 7 Propellant storage throughout
3360 hours
For 7 engine burn cycles, there
will be 4 extensions and 3
retractions
Phase 3.8 Propellant storage throughout
20.0 hours
For one engine burn cycle,
there will be one retraction
Electronics operating only
during spin for 12.0 hours
Phase 3.9 Propellant storage throughout
460 hours
Phase 3. 10 Propellant storage throughout
12,700 hours
For 7 engine burn cycles, there
will be 4 extensions and 3
retractions
Phase 3. 11
Electronics operating only
during spin for 12,532 hours
Propellant storage throughout
For one engine burn cycle,
there will be one retraction
Electronics operating only
during spin for 1.2 hours
- 17-
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All components will be subjected to vacuum environment throughout
the flight, the engines external and exposed to meteorite impingement and
space radiation.
Reaction Control Subsystem Component List For
Artificial Gravity Spin,
Including Control Electronics
Two Apollo "Quads" with propellant interconnection
Two engines per "Quad"
Spin Propulsion
g Helium Tanks
Z Fill Valves and Disconnects
6 Helium Solenoid Valves
8 Regulators
4 Burst Discs and Filters
4 Relief Valves
4 Fuel Tanks
4 Oxidizer Tanks
12 Propellant Solenoid Valves
4 Main Filters
4 Fill Valves and Caps
4 Rocket Engines
12 Check Valves
IDENTIFICATION OF CRITICAL FUNCTIONS AND COMPONENTS
Even though the functions of providing either spin-up and de-spin
forces or exercises are critical to crew health, no single component
failure is expected to cause crew loss. Sufficient internal redundancy and
the placement of propellant supplies on opposite sides of the spacecraft will
prevent catastrophic loss from a single failure The pressurizing gas, fuel,
and oxidizer storage reach adequate reliability levels through redundancy;
however, the exposure of the rocket engines to meteoroid bombardment is
unnecessary. Special development of components for long-term propellant
compatibility, addition of an alternate pressurization method, and protection
of engines during long inactive periods are recommended for reliability
improvement.
Discussion of Redundancy Available
The candidate subsystem, evaluated for effects of each component
failure on the mission, is concisely presented in the reliability logic
- 18-
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diagram (Figure 3-2). Either helium supply can pressurize all propellants
through the interconnecting piping and isolation solenoids. Within each helium
supply system, the helium fill valve must be operated remotely because of
safety regulations. It is redundant with the quick disconnect to seal pressure
within the tank during flight. The regulators and solenoid valves are
redundant for the open and closed failure modes. Some protection against
a small external leak may be gained by closing the solenoid valves between
operations.
Since the fuel supply system is identical in logic with the oxidizer
supply system, the problems and redundancies are much the same. Check
valves are redundant between the helium supply and each propellant, so that
hypergolic vapors cannot mix. The secondary check valves to the non-
bellows tank are shown redundant in the flow direction only because vapor
return is not serious. Liquid entrapped in the gas side of the partially empty
bellows tank can be returned if the bellows is designed with a residual spring
force. The isolating propellant solenoids would have to be kept open some-
what longer than minimum to allow transfer time. No relief valve operation
is anticipated at normal operating pressures. Actuation is predicated on
rupture of the burst disc which is designed to break above these pressures.
Some positive means for prevention of propellant leakage through the fill
valve is shown by the standby cap. Since it is expected that tank pressure
will be low during filling, a cap manually placed is sufficient.
Discussion of Critical, Low Reliability Assemblies
For this report, criticality will continue to be evaluated at three
levels:
1. Single failure mode resulting in possible crew loss.
2. Single failure mode resulting in possible mission loss.
3. Other considerations.
Some conditions may be separated into terms of crew safety and
mission success, even ona long interplanetary mission. For this spin
engine subsystem, a major mission success category occurs in earth orbit
prior to transplanetary injection in the form of any nonrepairable failure
which will cause mission abort, or at least a change to another vehicle.
Another mission success condition is the extension process. If extension
is not accomplished, a severe series of exercises will be required to retain
sufficient bodily strength to withstand re-entry. The capacity of the exer-
cises to produce the desired strength has not yet been proven, since the
longest flight to date is 13 days, but exercise and drugs are presumed to be
- 19 -
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proven by the time of interplanetary flight. On the other hand, retraction
is critical to crew members because of their inability to make mid-course
corrections and to acquire the re-entry corridor.
No single component nor assembly is critical or has low reliability.
Redundancy is provided throughout the system. However, return-trip
meteoroid bombardment in the severe flux region may cause some difficulty.
Even though knowledge of this environment is very imprecise, the fact of
some risk is established. Since this spin engine system is only used during
actual spin-up and de-spin of less than one hour each, continued exposure
throughout the several thousand of hours coast is unnecessary and adds to
the risk. A protective covering could be extended to cover these engines
during coast.
Although redundant, the helium pressurizing gas is extremely
difficult to retain during the long mission, not only because of changes in
the seal but because of molecular penetration of thin walled materials. An
alternate system of pressurization would be required if tests continue to
show excessive permeation. Several methods (Figures 3-3, -4, and -5)
based on gas generation from combustion products are being considered at
the present time including:
l. Separate combustion chambers for fuel-rich and oxidizer-rich
gas generation. (Pulsing-using check valves or continuous-using
turbine and pumps. )
One fuel-rich gas generator and an oxidizer heat exchanger
(pulsing, using check valves; or continuous, using turbine and
pumps.
. Direct injection of propellant into opposite hypergol tanks from a
higher pressure source.
. A central emergency pressure supply for all propulsion
subsystems, using any one of a number of hypergolic pro-
pellant gas generators.
SPECIAL CONSIDERATIONS
The spin engine subsystem must be operated at the same time as the
extension mechanism and the electronics necessary to determine the spin
attitude. No interface problems are anticipated, since timing is not critical;
i.e., there are long operating times with wide cut-off tolerances.
-23 -
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I
HEAT EXCHANGER
Il
Figure 3-4. Gas Generation and Heat Exchanger
f
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Figure 3-5. Separate Propellant Injection Concept
- 25 -
SID 67-478-2
NORTH AM FRICAN AVIATION, I NC. __ SPACEand INFORMATION SYSTEMS DIVISION
Development implications of the recommended alternate configurations
are:
I . Positive expulsion device bias to return to full tank after each
operation will not require extensive development.
Engine covering for meteoroid protection can be designed on a
current technology basis but may be heavy. Development of
meteroid bumpers should continue with design freeze only when
production is necessary. Additional data should be obtained of the
meteoroid flux to be encountered; so that a more optimum weight
can be determined.
. Continuing study of human tolerances to space environment is
required to determine the criticality of the artificial gravity mode.
The present uncertainty of long duration degradation during zero g
must be dispelled by actual test in earth orbit.
Helim-n storage and alternate pressurization means should continue
to be developed. The current benefits of helium are sufficient to
stimulate containment research; however, an emergency system
sh0uld be available for long, independent missions.
. Positive expulsion is being accomplished by a heavy stainless
steel bellows. Continuing development of an impervious flexible
bladder will decrease the required equipment weight and increase
the weight available for experiments.
Extensive earth-based facilities are not required; however, long
duration, zero g enviromnents in earth orbit are achieved only by a special
spacecraft, and detern_ination of meteoroid fluxes throughout the flight
path requires special space probes. The earth orbit experiments must be
manned, whereas the space probes can be unmanned.
RESULTS OF SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS
The spin engine subsystem is currently required because of uncertainty
over human tolerance to zero-g space conditions. If alternate tolerance
methods become available, the entire artificial gravity system may be
modified.
Spin engines are presently the most feasible way to achieve the thrust
for spin-up and de-spin. Reasonably high performance within acceptable
operating times is available from current engines; and by suitable redun-
dancy, the reliability can be made acceptable even for the long durations.
-26-
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The current reliability logic is too complicated for simulation by the
Recomp computer; however, a gross estimate indicates a subsystem
reliability near 95 percent. The problems are generally caused by com-
ponents characteristics rather than by considerations of the overall con-
figuration. For a higher required goal, small improvement in both areas
will result in large subsystem reliability improvements.
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5. REACTION CONTROL SUBSYSTEM
FUNC TION
Spacecraft attitudes during zero g must be controllable automatically
and on command for a variety of functions, including: initial orientation for
an impulse, roll control during an impulse, fine orientation for astronomical
observations, and docking maneuvers for earth orbit assembly and returning
planetary probes. Normal attitude, automatic holdwiU free the astronauts
for attention to other operations without excessive disorientation, with the
fine control reserved for special sightings. Direct astronaut control
provides the flexibility necessary for unprogrammed, terminaloperations
and emergency maneuvers.
The reaction control subsystem provides the thrust necessary to move
the spacecraft for orientation and small translations in any direction. The
baseline configuration is shown in Figure 4-1. A list of components is
provided. The products of hypergolic combustion are directed opposite to
required spacecraft motion and controlled by on-off valves. The thrust
value of each rocket motor is small enough to allow fine attitude control by
quick-acting valves. Timing for the precise attitude hold mode requires
that a minimum impulse be applied at the required time to establish
stabilization conditions for astronaut observation and full power
coma unication.
The choice of an equipment configuration similar to Apollo will
utilize already developed hardware in a suitably redundant condition to
provide many alternate modes and gradual functional deterioration with
increasing failures. With four equally spaced sets of four opposite pointing
modes, all translations are possible- forward, backward, up, down, right,
and left in addition to the turning moments of pitch-up, pitch-down, yaw-right,
yaw-left, clockwise roll, and counter-clockwise roll.
DEFINITION OF DUTY CYCLES
Stabilization is required during zero-g periods of operation, which
occur during earth orbit, during mid-course corrections en route to Mars
and return, planetary encounter, and earth reentry orientation. Automatic,
normal, and fine control, as well as astronaut capability for control in any
direction will be possible. The detailed schedule for each mode has not been
made because of the advisability of in-flight determination of specific times,
but the reaction control subsystem is considered operating throughout the
zero g times with capability for operation in any mode.
-29 -
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Figure 4-i. Reaction Control Subsystem Schematic
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Every mid-course correction will require axial thrust for propellant
acquisition and roll control during main engine firing. Although the main
propellant tanks have passive propellant acquisition means (screens and
baffles}, the only position means is the aft-directed thrust of the reaction
control subsystem. Roll control during thrusting is required for a single
main engine, and may be relegated to a back-up capacity when multiple
engines are used.
Docking maneuvers could occur at any time during zero g, but they are
considered no more severe on the equipment than attitude hold. The
capability of translation and rotation in any direction will be made available
for immediately accessible astronaut implementation.
The normal method of reentry requires separation of the reentry
vehicle from the rest of the spacecraft, and is accomplished by the operation
of the forward thrusting engines. Once begun, separation should be as great
as possible to make collision extremely improbable; i.e., retro thrust
should be continued until propellant is exhausted. However, that require-
ment may be modified by specific vehicle design if the retro vehicle can
be designed to burn and fall away safely or to utilize aerodynamics drag
for positive separation. For this design, aerodynamic separation is con-
sidered as a back-up mode.
A preliminary duty cycle for the reaction control subsystem for
attitude control, shown below, has been extracted from the overall mission
timeline.
Phases 3. 1 through 3.4 Propellant storage throughout 24 hours
Engines tested for 100 cycles
Phase 3. 5 Propellant storage throughout 48 hours
Engines operated for docking stability for
150 cycle s
Engines operated for propellant acquisition and
for roll controlduring thrusting, for 2 cycles
Phase 3.6 Propellant storage throughout 0.7 hours
Phase 3.7 Propellant storage throughout 3360 hours
Engines operated to stabilize and to acquire
propellants during zero g only and to provide
roll control during thrusting for 602 cycles
L
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Phase 3. 8 Propellant storage throughout Z0 hours
Engines operated to stabilize and to acquire
propellants during zero g only and to provide
roll control during thrusting for 400 cycles
Phase 3.9 Propellant storage throughout 460 hours
Engines operated to stabilize carefully during
the planetary encounter for 8000 cycles
Phase 3.10 Propellant storage throughout 1Z, 700 hours
Engines operated to stabilize and to acquire
propellant during zero g only and to provide
roll control during thrusting for 602 cycles
Phase 3. II Propellant storage throughout 20 hours
Engines operated to stabilize during zero g
only for accurate reentry corridor determination
for 200 cycles
Phase 3.12 Propellant storage until separated from reentry
capsuIe for 0. 1 hours
Engines operated to stabilize during zero g, to
acquire propellants in the main subsystem, to
provide roll control during retro, to stabilize
after retro, and to propel spent vehicle away
from reentry vehicle for Z cycles.
All components will be subjected to vacuum environment throughout the
flight, the engines external and exposed to meteoroid impingement and space
radiation.
Reaction Control Subsystem Component List for Attitude Control
4 Apollo "C)uads"
Attitude Control Propulsion
4 Helium Tanks
4 Fill Valves and Disconnects
8 Helium Solenoid Valves
16 Regulators
32
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8 Burst Discs and Filters
8 Relief Valves
8 Fuel Tanks
8 Oxidizer Tanks
16 Propellant Solenoid Valves
8 Main Filter s
8 Fill Valves and Caps
16 Rocket Engines
3?- Check Valves
IDENTIFICATION OF CRITICAL FUNCTIONS AND COMPONENTS
The reaction control subsystem satisfies critical functions with
noncritical components. From the previous definitions of criticality (crew
safety required, mission success required, and other), the following
functions are crew safety and mission success critical:
. Attitude control is required to provide orientation for midcourse
correction impulses so that the earth reentry corridor will be
achieved.
Roll control during impulse thrust is required to prevent
incapacitation of astronauts and to utilize all main propellants.
Uncontrolled rotation would prevent astronaut motion and move
propellants away from the tank outlet.
The other three functions have alternate modes for their
accomplishment:
I. Main propellant acquisition by internal screens and baffles.
2. Retro vehicle separation by aerodynamic force.
3. Docking maneuvers could be accomplished by the other vehicle.
All components are used in some redundant mode except during earth
orbit. If unrepairable failure should occur in earth orbit, the mission would
be aborted or another vehicle would be assembled. Once the craft is
committed to the transplanetary mission, the redundancy is available to
return the crew safely and to accomplish the mission.
Discussion of Redundancy Available
The attached reliability logic diagram (Figures 4-2 and 4-3)
illustrates the multiple component redundancy available from the four
reaction control modules. Each module is entirely separate from the
- 33-
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others: no cross utilization of propellant is considered. However, not only
are any three out of the four propellant supplies sufficient for crew safety but
also each propellant tank within each module is considered redundant with the
other tank within that module. The propellant fill and drain valves are not
operated during flight. They serve only to retain the fluid and are backed-up
by a cap, which is manually applied. The helium fill valve must be remotely
operated because of launch area safety regulations when the tank is fully
pressurized; therefore the quick disconnect must include a redundant seal
mechanism. Helium control and regulation in each module are performed by
a redundant array of two solenoid valves and four regulators. All three
items in each leg (one solenoid and two regulators) have to be open if that leg
is to operate successfully; but any one of the items can prevent over-
pressurization from an open failure. Each set of four check valves is
internally connected for redundancy in both forward and reverse flow.
Preference has been given to prevention of reverse flow since uncontrolled
passage of propellants would overpressurize the opposite tanks, even though
slight reverse leakage may not be a severe problem; i.e., smallleaks may
increase tank pressure within acceptable limits. Since the relief function
should never be used in flight, a burst disc will maintain a positive seal.
This will be backed up by a re-setting relief valve.
Rocket engines are required to provide the attitude control thrust
necessary for spacecraft return. As shown in the logic diagram, all
attitude functions are accomplished redundantly with roll in either direction
by any one of four engines. The representation of engine redundancy is
difficult on a logic diagram, since the indicated logic only occurs when all
propellant supplies are operative. When one propellant supply fails, four
engines are inoperative, and redundancy is lost in either pitch-up and pitch-
down or yaw-right and yaw-left. This slight decrease in reliability is
considered compensated for by the possibility of continued, though difficult,
attitude control with two modules.
Discussion of Critical, Low Reliability Assemblies
The limited use during zero g and translation allows reasonable, high
reliability results from components not much better than exist today.
However, difficulties exist in the design of this subsystem, even though there
are neither critical components nor low reliability subassemblies. As shown
in the spin engine section, helium is difficult to retain during long flights,
the bellows method of positive propellant expulsion weighs much more than a
comparable bladder, and the extent of meteroroid flux on the exposed engines
is relatively unknown. Therfore, recommendations are again made to
develop auxiliary means for propellant pressurization, to continue develop-
ment of an impermeable bladder, and to enclose the engines in a meteoroid
bumper during the spin mode.
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Redundancy Required
Existing redundancy is necessary for the functions required; however,
if the meteoroid bumpers should be impractical, spare rocket engines would
provide extra assurance. A redesign of the engine connections could allow
quick disconnect and replacement by an astronaut in extra-vehicular
maintenance.
SPECIAL C ONSIDERATIONS
The only interfaces between the attitude control subsystem and the
others (except for structures) is in the electrical control. With an adequate
electrical power supply, no serious problems are anticipated from plutme
impingement or simultaneous separation of guidance, communication, and
main propulsion subsystems. Batteries may be used to provide peak power
for the gimbal actuators during mid-course correction. Optical and thermal
transmission and reflection may be affected by the products of combustion,
but this remains to beproven.
Development of reliable equipment for the previous recommendations
should begin at once; so that the best design can be made at the time of
design freeze. Even though the bellows expulsion is available, the weight
expense should be minimized. More accurate determination of meteoroid
flux must be accomplished for minimum weight bumper design. The effects
of engine exhaust plume will be adequately documented on the many Apollo
flights already planned. Helium storag e provisions for long duration should
be tested and developed to insure minimum leakage. Investigation of
alternate pressure sources should continue as a parallel effect. Finally,
seal materials should be tested under long exposure to propellants and with
multiple exposures to space environment. These developments are
considered the most fruitful for increasing performance and reliability.
Space probes, earth orbit vehicles, and earth-based multiple
environment chambers are the required additions to the present facilities.
The few probes will cover expected manned vehicle paths, and a single,
earth-orbiting laboratory will satisfy space duration requirements. Earth-
based chambers should be designed to provide simulated radiation, vibration,
vacuum, and stress, so that the effects can be observed before actual space
operation. The earth-orbit program could replace the earth-based
laboratory if a timely development program is scheduled.
RESULTS OF SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS
Success of the entire mission depends on the operation of the reaction
control subsystem. It is imperative that the attitude control function be
accomplished during every zero-g operational phase. Utilization of Apollo
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equipment (with some additional development) will build on current
technology toward the new interplanetary environmental and performance
requirements.
Recomp computer limitations prevent exact computation of the
probability of subsystem success from the detailed reliability logic and
estimated failure rates. Since, a quick assessment of the reliability
indicates a value greater than 99 percent, the problems are considered to be
at the component level rather than in the configuration. If an increase in the
reliability goal is required, another review of the entire subsystem will be
necessary.
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5. MAIN ENGINE SUBSYSTEM
FUNCTION
Major translation impulses will be required for transplanet and trans-
earth midcourse corrections, planet encounter trajectory adjustment, and
earth reentry corridor acquisition. To accomplish this with the transplanet
injection booster, exceptional accuracy beyond the present and near future
state-of-the-art would be required. The many extraneous forces integrated
over a mission of long duration cause sizable errors in spacecraft location
direction, and velocity; e.g., multiple-body gravitational effects, solar
wind pressures, accuracy of navigation equipment, and injection conditions.
Early correction will remove most of the injection errors, and subsequent
small impulses will improve the accuracy of planetary encounter and
reentry corridor acquisition.
Dependence on a single engine, (as shown in Figures 5-I and 2), to
make these critical corrections entails a severe risk, even though redundant
equipment items are placed throughout the subsystem. It is difficult to make
the several critical items as reliable as desired, and the risk of the effects
of single failure is unnecessary.
With one large single engine, timing of the impulses is very impor-
tant so that the corrections are made as accurate as dictated by the
guidance requirements, especially for planet encounter and reentry
trajectories.
DEFINITION OF DUTY CYCLES
After the initial test firing in earth orbit, the present plan is to make
three midcourse corrections during transplanet trajectory and three during
transearth trajectory, with the last firing utilizing all remaining propel-
lants to decrease reentry velocity. The firing times and numbers of
operations are appoximate, since each trajectory will be affected by
different forces and will require different corrections. The example duty
cycle for the main propulsion subsystem is as follows.
- 43 -
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Main Propulsion Subsystem for Course Correction
Phases 3. 1 through 3.4
Phase 3.5
Phase 3.6
Phase 3. 7
Phase 3.8
Phase 3. 9
Phase 3. 10
Phase 3. 1 1
Phase 3. 1Z
Propellant storage throughout Z4 hours
Propellant storage throughout 48 hours
Engine operated for one test firing of 0.5 sec.
duration
Propellant storage throughout 0.7 sec.
Propellant storage throughout 3360 hours
Engine operated for one course correction
for 25 sec.
Propellant storage throughout Z0 hours
Engine operated for two course corrections
to obtain correct planetary encounter
trajectory for 50 seconds
Propellant storage throughout 460 hours
Propellant storage throughout 1Z, 700 hours
Engine operated for two midcourse correc-
tions for 50 sec.
Propellant storage throughout Z0 hours
Propellant storage throughout 0.1 hours
Engine operated for one retro firing for
Z5 sec.
All parts of the engine will be exposed to space environments through-
out the mission. A meteoroid bumper is anticipated around the propellants
but not around the thrust chamber, gimbal equipment, and nozzle.
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Main Propulsion Subsystem for Course Correction
(Subsystem Component List)
Propellant Supply
Z Helium Tanks 8 Check Valves
1 Helium Fill Valve and Cap Z Heat Exchangers
1 Helium Fill Coupling
1 Helium Temperature Transducer
3 Helium Pressure Transducers
2 Helium Solenoid Valve
4 Helium Regulators
2 Circuit Breakers, Switches, and
Relays
Z Propellant Vent Quick-Disconnect
Assemblies
2 Relief Valves and Burst Discs
1 Bleed Valve and Test Point
Z Propellant Fill andDrainAssemblies
4 Propellant Tanks
3 Propellant Temperature Transducers
9 Test Points 2 Flexible Bellows
Engine Assembly and Gimbal Actuators
1 Engine Assembly 1 Nozzle Extension
2 Ball Screw Assemblies 1 Chamber Pressure Transducer
2 Bellows and Cases
4 Gimbal and Bearing Assemblies
_- Ball Valves and Actuation
Assemblies
IDENTIFICATION OF CRITICAL FUNCTIONS AND COMPONENTS
Provision of impulse for course correction is required for mission
success and crew safety. Acquisition of planet encounter and reentry
trajectories is dependent on this subsystem to progressively correct the
error caused by the multiple environments and inaccuracies. The function
v.-¢ retxoo ......Lnru_ at reentry is considered to be redundant with the reentry heat
shield, since the effect of retro thrust will be to increase the safety margin
of the shield but not to bring the velocity within the shield capability.
- 47 -
SID 67-478-2
NORTH AMERICAN AVIATION, INC. SPACE and INFORMATION SYSTEMS DIVISION
Components are also critical to the mission and to the crew. Even
though a valiant attempt has been made to provide internal redundancy,
success of the current subsystem is unnecessarily dependent on single
failure modes, especially for long duration missions; e. g. , helium supply
tank, heat exchangers, propellant tanks, bellows, fuel line bleed valve,
portions of the gimbal actuator, and the injector, thrust chamber, and
nozzle assembly.
Redundancy Available
Much internal redundancy is available, as shown by the following
reliability logic diagrams, Figures 5-3 and 5-4.
l. Propellant fill valve seals are redundant with the manually
placed cap.
Zo Helium fill valve requires a quick-disconnect back-up because
of pad safety precautions at full tank pressure.
1 The control solenoid and regulator array is similar to the
attitude control configuration and provides redundancy in either
fail-open or closed.
. Check valve arrays provide redundancy in the forward and
reverse flow control with emphasis on prevention of reverse
flow. Uncontrolled interchange of propellants would over-
pressurize the opposite tanks.
5. Vent valve seals are redundant with quick disconnects.
. The relief function is not expected to occur; therefore, the
relief valve is in standby redundancy with the positive seal
burst disc.
. Nitrogen gas actuation assemblies for the main propellant valves
are redundant; i.e., one assembly is in stand-by, while the other
controls the operating ball valves.
. By ingenious arrangement, the main propellant ball valves are
redundant for failure open, closed, and internal leakage.
. Propellant line bellows have several plies of material; so several
layers of internal redundancy.
10. Selective internal portions of the gimbal actuator assembly; e. g. ,
motor, electric clutch, travel indicators, and rate sensors.
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Discussion of Critical, Low Reliability Assemblies
Many critical components required for mission success and crew
safety have been designed with a large safety margin to lower the risk as
far as practicable.
Helium Tank
Helium is very difficult to retain within tank materials of current
types. The large margin required to make the component sufficiently
reliable also increases the weight. Continued development of helium
containment materials is required to minimize penalties of long-term
storage. Continued development of an alternate pressurization means
would provide needed redundancy, as illustrated in the Spin Engine Section.
Heat Exchangers
Although the heat exchanger size is large enough to provide the
pressurizing gas heating function, any internal leakage reduces that margin,
and external leakage is critical. Reliability is aided when there are no
moving parts, but careful design is required to account for all the internal
stresses from differential temperatures.
Propellant Tanks
The safety margin seems adequate at the present time, but will require
review as operating experience is gained.
Fuel Line Bleed Valve
No redundancy now exists for this valve, whose function is to insure
propellant at the ball valve inlet by bleeding gas from the line. If no in-
flight actuation is required, a manual cap could be placed over the end of
the line.
Gimbal Actuator s
Portions of the actuator are not redundant; e. g. , structural rods,
ball screw assembly and bearings, and internal gearing. Another critical
review of this component is required, since the current reliability goal has
not been demonstrated.
Injector and Chamber
That these are taken together signifies their interdependence for
combustion stability and low heat transfer rate. Traditional development
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has been extensive to achieve desired reliability. Current demonstrated
reliability is insufficient to accomplish the multiple starts and short runs
required. Even though the duration margin is very large, the frequency
of incidence of combustion instability is still too high. A possible solution
is replacement by three assemblies of lower thrust, to provide redundancy,
to allow greater accuracy in impulse application, and to take advantage of
a shorter profile for low weight meteoroid bumpers. Exposure of the
engine to long coast periods of meteoroid bombardment is a large risk at
the present maximum flux.
Ball Valve Seals
Even though redundant, the sealing capabilities of the ball valves are
questionable over long periods of times in contact with propellant. Not
only is compatibility unproven, but also seal deformation with time reduces
its effectiveness. Careful monitoring of current design changes to a poppet
type of seating arrangement and inclusion of additional valving to increase
seal redundancy must be made before the function can be considered capable
of high reliability accomplishment.
SPECIAL CONSIDERATIONS
Interfaces with other subsystems are important considerations; e. g.,
guidance control of the gimbal actuators, heating of the rear of the space-
craft from the jet expansion around the nozzle, cut-off control for accurate
impulse achievement, and environmental control to prevent propellant
freezing.
If begun now, development of all the recommended assembly changes
is possible within the expected time period before an interplanetary mission.
In particular, the integration of multiple rocket engines with the propellant
tanks and structure should be commenced as soon as hardware is available.
This would be beneficial not only to the interplanet vehicles, but also to the
current Apollo.
The only special facilities required would be the results of probes
for meteoroid data and an earth orbit, long duration, seal laboratory.
KESULTS OF SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS
Even though much effort has been placed on internal redundancy, the
remaining critical items are numerous and full of risk. A detailed review
should be undertaken, and a long-term development test plan prepared.
Many changes may be required before the subsystem is considered adequate
for the increased severity of the interplanetary mission.
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The large number of success modes considered in the reliability
logic diagram exceeds the capability of the Recomp computer. An approxi-
mate value of reliability was determined to be 90 percent based on expected
component increases. Both the configuration and the individual component
contribute to this reliability low value; therefore, both could be improved
for the next design.
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6. ELECTRICAL POWER SYSTEM
FUNCTION
The selected electric power system consisting of a radioisotopic heat
source for a primary dynamic Rankine cycle with backup thermoelectric
conversion provides flexibility to meet mission requirements and contin-
gencies. The manned mission has as a minimum requirement the need for
sufficient electrical power to support life while permitting spacecraft opera-
tion during return under emergency conditions. If an electrical power con-
tingency develops shortly after mission commitment, minimum backup
electrical power of approximately 3.6 KWe must be available for well over
one year for a four-man environmental system and other essential spacecraft
operations.
OPERATING REQUIREMENTS
The electric power system must provide power for the entire mission
duration, as noted on the timeline of Section II.
IDENTIFICATION OF CRITICAL FUNCTIONS AND COMPONENTS
A continuous source of electrical power is essential to both mission
success and crew safety; however, with the exception of the isotope source
and boiler, redundancy is provided throughout the system. The estimated
reliability of the isotope and boiler is extremely high, and the characteris-
tics of this component are such that redundancy is not feasible in any event.
Available Redundancy
The primary dynamic Rankine mercury system provides for the
operation of any two of a total of seven available 3 KWe units. A cascade
thermoelectric system will permit a 3.6 KWe output for backup power or
emergency conditions in the event of complete primary system failure.
Figure 6-1 represents a reliability block diagram of the system.
Design considerations affecting reliability of the isotope electric
power system include high integrity of the fluid circulating loops combined
w,u, the necessity of contlnuous _'_+ rein .... 1 ¢,-nm th_ ,-_ini.qntnpe boiler
from inception through final disposition. The single radioisotope boiler
system is to be designed for intact return to earth. Heat removal is effected
by CRU, thermoelectric and/or excess isotope power rejection systems.
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Since leakage in any loop is expected to inactivate the associated loop equip-
ment, two separate loops in parallel will provide added assurance against
leakage failure of the thermoelectric and the excess power rejection systems.
Each of the seven CRU systems is to be provided with a separate single
circulating system to minimize loss of the primary power system capability
by fluid leakage. The above combination of pumped fluid systems provides
a choice of continuous heat removal. Excess heat removal by CRU system
operation will be made at the expense of added CRU operating time and/or
capacity to reject the electrical energy as heat from parasitic load resistors.
The nature of eutectic NaK in the excess power and thermoelectric
loops and in the primary CRU loops requires special consideration of their
presence outside the system. Long-term human exposure to mercury vapor
at normal temperatures is undesirable, and its effect on sensitive equipment
can be harmful to its operation. NaK is readily oxidized in the presence
of OZ to the extent of being considered incendiary when hot or ex.p_ed to
water, or its vapor, with the attendant production of H Z. The oxidized pro-
ducts of NaK are caustic and irritating to human tissue and mucous mem-
branes. For these reasons, fluid lines containing these materials will be
isolated to avoid their introduction into sensitive system compartments,
including the 1_¢_ support system. Remote control and monitoring features
will permit suitable isolation on the spacecraft.
The dynamic isotopic Rankine mercury system utilizes a two phase
liquid vapor operation in both the spin-up and zero-g conditions. While
ground tests and studies indicate that the system is suitable for zero-g con-
ditions, confirmation of two-phase static condenser designs is recommended
during AAP flights.
A battery assembly of primary and secondary batteries is provided to
supplement the primary power systems during peak loads for limited duration,
if required. The batteries are rated at 150 AH/4Z00 WH. Reentry batteries
of 12 AH/3360 WH are provided to furnish power required for reentry and
recovery operations.
Additional backup consisting of a solar voltaic system was evaluated.
The static solar voltaic system has the longest history of successful
power generation for space systems. Its use as a supplementary and/or
emergency system in flyby missions is justified by demonstrated reliability
in space. The present uncertainties of
mission exposure times and trajectorie
reduced by future probes. In addition,
meteoroid effects for proposed
s related to sizing and design will be
continued advancements in the
development of solar cell capabilities are expected to extend effective outputs
and further reduce need for reserve exposure areas to compensate for space
environment damage.
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However, because of complications introduced by panel orientation
requirements (particularly during the spacecraft spin mode) and dependability
of the basic system, this system was not considered for purposes of the
interim report.
Critical, Low Reliability Assemblies
Utilizing failure rates provided by Atomics International, a reliability
estimate of 0.983 for the entire mission was calculated. This compares
with the value of 0.969 obtained by computer simulation. The elements
possessing the highest failure rates (k) are; {1) ac-dc converter with a
failure rate (AI) of Z5 x 10"6; (2) dc-dc converter, k = 25 x 10 -6 {estimated);
(3) expansion compensator, k 3.6 x 10"6; and (4) CRU's, h = 6. 686 x 10 -6
The CRU's contribution to the system unreliability is negligible because of
the number of stand-by units. The converters not only have stand-by units,
but are in separate loops; isotope dynamic and emergency de. The expan-
sion compensator has no stand-by, but one unit is in each of the two systems.
The contribution of these elements to the total subsystem unreliability of
0.017 is as follows:
Expansion Compensator 9.4 percent
ac-dc Converter
dc-dc Converter 14.2 percent
Isotope and Boiler 5.0 percent
The remainder of the unreliability is a function of a number of items
posessing fairly low failure rates and the extremely long operating time.
No other single unit or assembly contributes as much unreliability as the
items listed. However, it is probable that design improvements, additional
test data, and reliability improvements which can be expected to occur prior
to vehicle fabrication will result in overall reliability improvement.
Redundancy Required
No additional redundancy is considered feasible or necessary.
SPECIAL CONSIDERATIONS
Considerable development work is required for the isotope dynamic
systems in general. No space missions utilizing these systems have been
accomplished. However, ground test results conducted to date indicate
high inherent reliability, which will be validated by flight experience prior
to the Manned Mars mission.
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7. ENVIRONMENTAL CONTROL/LIFE SUPPORT SUBSYSTEM
FUNCTION
The function of the Environmental Control/Life Support System (EC/
LSS) is to provide a controlled and safe environment relevant to tempera-
ture, humidity, and atmospheric pressure and composition, remove all
wastes, including CO Z and liquid, and reclaim oxygen and water. The sub-
system as currently defined includes a cryogenic storage for oxygen and
nitrogen, awater reclamation system, and a CO? removal and O g recovery
system. The system is largely redundant, which will permit shutdown for
repairs or preventive maintenance.
OPE RATING RE OUIRE MENTS
The EC/LSS must operate continuously throughout the mission, either
totally or through one of the several redundant loops, as indicated in Fig-
ure 7-1. Total operating hours are equivalent to mission length, as defined
in Section 2.
IDENTIFICATION OF CRITICAL FUNCTIONS AND COMPONENTS
All functions performed by the EC/LSS system are essential to crew
safety, although the crew could function in an environment which drifts
beyond the upper and lower limit of atmospheric composition and tempera-
ture by a small amount. While no suit circuit is provided as an alternate
operating mode, the suit circuit itself is dependent on the basic system,
and it would not contribute to crew safety for a long mission except in the
event of a decompression caused by a repairable penetration of the pressure
structure.
Available Redundancy
A logic diagram representing the EC/LSS system is represented by
Figures 7-1 and7-2. The thermal control, humidity, and air temperature
control and CO 2 reduction/electrolysis oxygen recovery units are redun-
dant and are shown on the diagram as redundant loops. Not shown in the
diagram, are multiple tanks for N 2 and 02; however, these tanks cannot
be considered truly redundant, because the mission probably could not be
completed if appreciable amounts of N 2 and 02 were made unavailable.
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Critical, Low-Reliability Assemblies
Failure rates derived from SID 65-761, Manned Mars and/or Venus
Flyby Vehicle Systems Study and from the Apollo Applications Program
were applied to the logic diagram blocks to obtain an indication of system
reliability. The estimates so obtained provide a gross indication of reliability
performance and serve to pinpoint those areas contributing most to
unreliability.
The preliminary estimate obtained by correlation of operating require-
ments and failure rates mentioned above indicates a reliability of 0.855,
which is inadequate for a manned mission. The cryogenic storage contributes
about 45 percent to the unreliability of the system. However, the design of
the Nz/O Z source has not been defined. Therefore, for purposes of pre-
liminary analysis the cryogenic storage of Block II Apollo was used, with
the H Z tanks being replaced by iNZ tanks. This system was not designed for
an extremely long mission and is perhaps more complex than required
because of its added function of supplying the Apollo fuel cells. Design
simplification will be the subject of additional study.
For the remainder of the system, no one assembly stands out as a
major source of unreliability, with the exception of the redundant pumps
which contribute about 16 percent to system unreliability.
Design refinements during the next study phase will improve the
reliability; however, it seems certain that inherent reliability must be
augmented by maintenance; as described in SID 65-761, to provide an
acceptable degree of crew safety. Evaluation of specific items for which
maintenance action or spares are recommended will be included in future
study activity.
SPECIAL CONSIDERATIONS
While it is recognized that the description and schematic layout are
preliminary, several aspects of the system should be clarified:
l, The method for returning the air from the conditioner compart-
ments to the environmental system is not indicated.
_0 The method by which the humidity control removes condensate
is not clearly defined. If it is done by absorbtion, the reactiva-
tion pzocess is not show**. If the humidity control is in the cold
glycol loop having an apparatus dew point temperature correspond-
ing to the glycol temperature, provisions are required for
transporting the condensate fro,n the humidity control to the
HzO recovery system.
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. Provision must be made for glycol circulation during the heating
cycle when the radiators are not in use.
4. Crew safety aspects during depressurization of both compartments
should be evaluated.
. In event of emergency, when radiators are inactive or damaged
and the water boiler is in use, provisions are necessary for
glycol circulation.
RESULTS OF SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS
Analysis results indicate that crew safety considerations require
improvements which probably cannot be achieved in the near future by
increases in equipment reliability alone. Provisions for maintenance must
be incorporated to provide adequate assurance of crew survival.
This subsystem will require considerable development prior to
mission use. This country has not as yet developed a closed loop system
having actual mission experience. This subsystem must be categorized as
one of the most critical equipment items, considering the current develop-
ment status and the essential nature of the function.
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FUNCTION
9. INTEGRATED ELECTRONICS
The integrated electronics subsystem (Figures 9-1 and 2) is used
mainly for maintenance of communications and tracking during the zero-g
modes of transplanetary operations and for transmittal via downlink of
scientific data during the planetary encounter operations. It is also used
for performance on on-board attitude control during the eight spin modes
of approximately 14 days each. During these times, the on-board G&N
optical equipment will be utilized to conduct star sightings and, in con-
junction with the display keyboard, the updating of the on-board computer(s).
During this time, the inertial measuring unit (IMU) is aligned with respect
to a celestially fixed coordinate system. Information concerning the attitude
of the spacecraft is required prior to coarse alignment, since the platform
alignment is accomplished by relating the platform gimbal angles to the
spacecraft axes. The G&Noptics will be utilized for target acquisition.
After performing sightings on stars with known positions, the mark button
actuation stores the optics trunnion angle, IMU girnbal angles, and time in
the computer. Ephemeris data are provided in the map and data viewer.
The computer commands the rotor of the coupling display unit resolver to
the desired gimbal angle; the stator of the resolver is actuated by a signal
representing the actual girnbal angle. The output of the resolver is an
error signal that represents the difference between the actual and desired
gimbal servo loop voltage to torque the platform gimbal until the actual and
desired angles correspond. A fine alignment is used to refine the position
of the IMU gimbals; the gimbal positions are controlled by torquing the
gyros and using the resultant gyro pick-off error signal and the DC torque
motors to align the gimbals. The outputs of the IMU resolvers are trans-
mitted to the coupling display unit resolvers, and an error signal, repre-
senting the difference between the IMU and CDU resolver positions, is
generated; this signal is transmitted through a Z-speed switch to the CDU
servo amplifier which drives the CDU shaft motor until the CDU resolver
output is nulled. The total number of pulses transmitted by the shaft
encoders to the computer and the CDU display panel indicates the gimbal
position for crew monitoring. Continuous tracking and ranging by MSFN
tracking stations will constitute the primary mode of obtaining trajectory
information. This will be accomplished by means of the on-board communi-
cations subsystem. A subsidiary function will be the transmittal of
scientific and mission status data by means of the PCM telemetry equipment.
The premodulation processor provides the interface connection between the
spacecraft data gathering equipment and the rf electronics equipment. It
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accomplishes signal modulation, demodulation, signal mixing, and the
proper switching of signals so that the correct intelligence corresponding
to a given mode of operation is transmitted. Present design data indicates
quadruple redundancy of the S-Band transponder equipment. In one mode,
the data are transmitted via the high gain antenna during the 0 gravity
mission phases; in another mode, the use of the omniantenna requires the
power amplifier to be utilized in order to obtain a sufficient signal to noise
ratio at the Earth receiving stations. Spacecraft orientation is maintained
via the star tracker and sun sensor equipment in conjunction with the
accelerometer. The S-Band equipment is a narrow-band, double conver-
sion, superheterodyne, automatic-phase tracking receiver and transmitter
operating in the 2 KMC region. Tracking is accomplished by a phase-
locked loop. A stable carrier signal is transmitted to the spacecraft,
filtered, frequency multiplied, and transmitted to MSFN. The ground
station utilizes an automatic phase control receiver to track the phase of
the spacecraft carrier by means of a reference signal. Ranging is accom-
plished by transmission of pseudo-random pulse trains to the spacecraft,
where the spacecraft carrier is modulated for transmission back to the
ground station. The time delay observed is then used to determine space-
craft range. The transmitter may operate in one of two modes--a coherent
mode, in which the radio frequency signal from the receiver is fed through
a phase modulator to the output, and a wide-band FM mode in which a volt-
age controlled oscillator is modulated by a composite waveform of telemetry
and voice. The power amplifier boosts the signal to a level of either 5 or
Z0 watts, depending upon the cathodic potential of the TWT. The power amp-
lifier generally achieves the same performance with the omniantenna as the
high gain antenna in the coherent mode of transmission. An alternate method
of retrieving scientific data during the planetary encounter is via the film
cameras and tape recorder unit (Data Storage Equipment). Whether this
method would constitute mission success is as yet, undetermined.
OPERATING REQUIREMENTS
Operating requirements are indicated on the time line in Section Z.
CR/TICAL FUNCTIONS AND COMPONENTS
Mission simulation studies on the Recomp II computer indicate an
overall electronics subsystem reliability of 0. 3019 for the phases from
transplanetary injection to Earth entry. Of the total mission failures,
17 percent were caused by failures in the communications equipment and
83 percent by failure in the Guidance and Control equipment. Of the former
equipment, the major part (i. e. , 88 percent of the 17 percent) contribution
to the unreliability was due to failures in the star tracker, used for space-
craft alignment for proper orientation of the high gain antenna. Of the
latter equipment, the major contributors to the 83 percent unreliability
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component, in descending order, were the Gg_N optics (46 percent), the
SCS attitude electronics (32 percent}, and CMC (21 percent). In addition,
reliability is compromised by limited life items such as the inertial
measurement unit and the travelling wave tubes, whose lives are less than
that of the corresponding mission operating times. These problem areas
may be alleviated partially by new techniques such as, for example,
nuclear magnetic resonance-based gyros, and varactor frequency multipli-
cation to obtain all solid state S-Band equipment. In addition, the relatively
long mission time of the Mars Flyby Mission will allow sparing of such
items as the Stabilization and Control attitude electronics at the subassembly,
or even possibly, part level. Thus a store of capacitors, transistors,
diodes, etc., with appropriate test equipment for fault isolation may be
carried on-board to effect in-flight repairs. In this way, it is anticipated
that the reliability objectives of the integrated electronics subsystem may
be met.
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10. COMPUTER METHODOLOGY
The results of individual failure mode analyses of the subsystems of
the Mars Flyby Vehicle System were encoded, and the model was entered
in the Recomp II Digital Computer, which was programmed with the Maxi-
mum Entropy Simulation Program (SIMAX). This program contains two
integral random number generators coded by the failure rate data for each
of the individual component items of the various subsystems. This coding
operation results in the simulation of operational mode failures during any
one of ten pre-assigned phases of the mission, fromtransplanetary injec-
tion to Earth encounter, in accordance with the actual probabilities of such
failures under the anticipated conditions of stress, duty cycles, etc. The
primary mode of operation, which is also the highest performance mode,
is analytically solved for, and a secondary random-number generator is
utilized to simulate single and multiple failures of the primary mode of
operation in accordance with the equipment failure rates of the items
comprising the primary modes. Following this, the secondary operational
modes are tested to determine the feasibility of completing the mission
under the conditions of failures in both the primary and secondary opera-
tional modes. Thus, each mission simulation does not begin unless the
primary mode of operation is inoperative. This procedure minimizes the
length of the computer runs, since the results of the mission simulations
are combined by the computer with the primary mode reliability (solved
for analytically) to arrive at the final value for the mission reliability of
each subsystem. The procedure also takes advantage of the quick turn-
around time on the Recomp II computer. This hybrid technique (i. e.,
probabilistic and closed-form analytic) results in a relatively high machine
efficiency comparable to accelerated testing at hyperenvironmental levels
to obtain statistically significant data in short test periods. This method-
ology is generally described as maximum entropy, in accordance with
theoretical considerations derived from information theory.
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1 1. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
The following pages present general reliability considerations, problem
areas, and subjects which must be investigated before extremely long manned
missions take place. The areas of investigation listed do not necessarily fall
within the responsibility sphere of System Effectiveness. Study areas which
do fall within the scope of the next study phase include: determination of
feasible methods, including redesign; extension of component life; incorpora-
tion of redundancy; and integration of man's maintenance capabilities into the
system.
RELIABILITY PRINCIPLES
l.
Z.
Practical Design Margins
Normal Earth operation to ASME standards approaching a 5-to-1 design
margin.
MSFC prefers margins near 2-to-I for space vehicle structures.
S-II experience has been borderline at 1. 5-to-1 for large cryogenic
tanks.
Requires great detail in uncovering all environment stress and material
strength variations.
Minimum Single Point Failures
Define single point failures as crew loss resulting from a single compo-
nent failure.
Initial design eliminates all single point failures.
Evaluate alternate, feasible methods minimizing risk from necessary
single point failures.
Provide internal redundancy and/or large-design margins for residual
single po{nt failures.
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3. Maintenance Provisions
Detection
Current measurements are insufficient to detect all critical failures.
Automatic versus manual monitoring has not been defined.
Diagnosis
Complicated equipment failures are extremely difficult to diagnose
for causes.
Earth-based computer diagnosis must be available to assist.
Correction
Adequate spares or repair capability must be provided.
Astronaut training must include time studies of possible replacements.
4. Demonstration Beyond Maximum Environments
Overstress tests will determine actual design margins.
Extrapolate parameter drift tests to indicate long duration performance.
Design number and kind of experiments for maximum information.
5. Resolution of all Failures
Cause and correction of each failure must be a major effort.
Individual component reliability demonstration only after a failure.
GENERAL PROBLEM AREAS
1. Materials
Specialized materials are being required to withstand novel environments
for longer than specified in any current tests. The natural environments
are new, and the induced environments require special consideration.
Sealing materials are particularly susceptible because of the successive
deterioration with proceeding mission phases due to creep, chemical
attack, radiation breakdown, and vacuum welding.
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Many components in current spacecraft will wear out or have insufficient
MTBF with increasing mission duration. They will require repair or
replacement. The increase in spares requires careful analysis and
trade-off among weight, design margin, and redundancy criteria.
3. Contamination
.
.
.
.
The ability to remove all significant contamination before flight has not
been demonstrated on current spacecraft. Small amounts of contamina-
tion in critical areas could jeopardize mission success at any time.
Metal to metal seats are particularly susceptible, and cabin atmosphere
cleanliness is critical.
Effects of Multiple Environmnets
Single environments are severe. The effects of multiple environments
are unknown. Addition of stresses may increase the load requirements
beyond the present earthbound capability for testing.
New Requirements
In general, new designs require a development period in which the
performance and reliability capability increases; e.g., the artificial
gravity-spin system will require careful design and test before being
available for transplanetary flight.
Crew-Machine Task Mix
The new requirements of a long, independent mission must be identified
in terms of an optimum mix of human and machine tasks using the best
features of each.
Optimization for Multiple Missions
In current programs optimization adjustments have not been performed
for various reasons. However, recognition of multiple objectives, the
emphasis to be placed on each, the mathematical model of the system,
including incentives, and the optimization by typical dynamic program-
ming methods are essential to the efficient conduct of any large future
program.
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8. Unknown Environments
The first few missions will be critical in their encounter of all actual
environments. The variations of present knowledge of space character-
istics are too wide to allow a definitive design; e. g. , meteoroid flux
level uncertainty changes solar panel size by an order of magnitude.
SPECIFIC INVESTIGATIONS
I. Space Environments on External Seals
Relief valves - vacuum welding of seats on long exposure.
Hatches - flow of current soft material under long-term compression.
Gimbal joints - vacuum welding of joints on long exposure, or high
reliability bellows.
Engine start valves - Flow of current soft seat in SPS valve for long
passive exposure.
Z. Retention of Fluids for Extended Duration
Attitude control and spin motor propellants - the present positive
expulsion bladder has not been tested for the intended duration, but
indication is that excessive gas leakage could occur.
Main engine propellants - the large weight requirements make redundancy
expensive, and all current vehicles rely on excess margin to compensate
for leaks. For this single source, one meteoroid puncture would prevent
midcourse correction.
Seal compatibility for extended duration - no known soft sealing material
is compatible with present corrosive propellants (for the durations
required).
Helium permeation through tank materials - intermolecular seepage of
helium through structural materials may prevent retention of helium in
high pressure tanks for amission of long duration.
Creep of materials under stress - titanium tanks are notorious for creep
and strength reduction with time.
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3. Meteoroid Frequency, Prevention, and Repair
1
°
Evaluation of risk of encounter - current knowledge is not accurate
enough to use in subsystem trade-off studies; e.g., solar panel life.
Structure and materials for energy dissipation - new materials and
configurations will be required to prevent puncture of critical areas
while remaining light in weight.
Detection of penetration - passive components and inaccessible locations
may prevent detection of failures due to penetrations.
Emergency procedures - detailed study of emergency procedures must
account for detection, analysis, and correction of failures due to
penetration.
Main Engine Critical Components
Outgassing of ablative material - rocket engine chamber cooling ablative
material is a plastic impregnated glass cloth which changes character-
istics on long exposure to vacuum.
Single versus multiple engines - although much internal redundancy
reduces criticality to a minimum, the uncertainties of rocket combustion
make dependence on a single engine for successful return a high risk.
Multiple engines would reduce that risk but require redesign.
Gimbal method - hard links, bearing joints, and uncertain responses
make current gimballing methods critical to success, since complete
redundancy is difficult to achieve. Gas ingestion or flexible joints could
improve reliability by complete redundancy and simplicity.
Artificial Gravity Methods and Ramifications
Extension and rotation initiation - new equipment and methods are
required.
Stability during rotation - since the masses are not point-concentrated,
and movement within each is required, deviations in rotation plane and
wobble need to be overcome without excessive expenditure of propellants
or damper weight.
Communication during rotation - communication between Earth and
rotating parts is difficult without power enough for an omni transmission.
The requirement of continuous antenna orientation throughout rotation
would be an added reliability, weight, and control problem.
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,
,
Guidance during rotation - star sighting would be difficult without the
added complexity- of continuously pointable optics.
Retraction and rotation cessation - careful control during de-spin will be
required to dissipate energy and dock without damage.
Reentry Environments
Acquisition of reentry corridor - man's ability to guide the vehicle to the
corridor should be determined.
Outgassing of ablative material - the ablative material is a plastic
impregnated material which changes characteristics with vacuum
exposure time.
Deterioration of parachute material - vacuum and radiation cause
strength loss.
Deterioration of parachute motors - exposure of solid propellant to
vacuum, radiation, and temperature variations causes changes in burn-
ing characteristics.
Inflight Failure Processing
Detection of relay drift - drift in relay setting could cause inadvertent
operations and inability to operate; e.g., no automatic recharging of
batteries.
Detection of residual propellant error - propellant management is critical,
so measurement of residual propellant must be accurate enough for
timely warning of over-use.
Failure signal hierarchy - studies must be made to trade off automatic
and manual failure detection means.
Computer programs for diagnosis - computer programs must be avail-
able to the astronaut for rapid failure diagnosis; e.g., on-board or
Earth-based equipment.
Resetting and recalibration techniques - the requirement of maintenance
means checking and recalibration of gages and equipment which drift due
to longevity and space environments.
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Wearout of Rotating Machinery
Glycol pumps in ECS circuit - insufficient operating life on current pumps.
Combined rotating unit in EPS - current life is insufficient; requires
development.
Gyros in guidance and stabilization systems - the mission duration
precludes accuracy, unless shutdown during spin is allowed.
Battery Integration into EPS
Reentry battery recharging - current batteries will lose charge without
load over a long period; e.g., six months. Reentry battery recharging
must be planned and tested.
Pyro battery recharging - a rearrangement of method must be made to
incorporate pyro batteries into the overall electrical loop for recharging;
i.e., completely separate circuits are not feasible.
10. Man's Ability to Control Vehicle with Simple Aids
Manual determination - need and initiation of impulse vector
Midcourse correction - critical and necessary functions with
accuracy limits.
Planetary turn - critical and necessary functions with accuracy
limits.
Reentry corridor - critical and necessary functions with accuracy
limits.
Minimum tools and skills required - astronaut abilities and tools needed
to supplement Earth guidance.
Optimum man-machine task mix - study of simple manual tools to
replace complex automatic equipment requires consideration of capabili-
ties of each in the mission context.
11. Environmental Control
Heating and cooling of propellants - main propellant freezing in exposed
areas near the main valves and gimbal piping requires continuous heating,
which causes a continuous power drain and the possibility of unreliable
heaters. Other methods should be studied.
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Insulation of cryogenic oxygen for extended duration - long manned
missions will require large quantities of oxygen. Efficient storage is
difficult since current insulations are insufficient to prevent excessive
heat transfer.
Small rocket engine heating - the small rocket chambers need heating to
prevent explosion when started. Since the heaters cause power drain,
alternate heating methods should be studied.
1Z. Biomedical Requirements
Psychology of long confinement - hazardous, monogamous confinement
in restricted area may prevent efficient performance of manual tasks.
Surgical tools and processes - long abort times require consideration of
all life saving functions in-flight; e. g. , surgery.
Waste processing - water and oxygen reclamation is critical to a vehicle
of feasible size.
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APPENDIX A. FUNCTIONAL ANALYSIS
This appendix is devoted to a functional description of the baseline
Mars/Venus Flyby Mission. The seven first-level phases from 3.6 {Perform
Transplanetary Injection) through 3. 12 {Perform Earth Retro) are empha-
sized because they constitute the challenge to reliability of long storage, long
duration operation, space environments, assembly, and maintenance capa-
bility. Each first level phase is further divided into several second-level
functions. Block diagrams (AFSC 375-5) are provided to illustrate functional
interrelationships. The necessity of each second level function to crew safety
and mission success has been assessed, and reliability logic diagrams have
been constructed. Three categories of necessity were used:
i. Crew Safety Critical - Failure of the function would cause crew
loss.
Mission Success Required - Failure of the function would cause
total or partial loss of mission objectives.
. Alternate - A failed function would be compensated for by another
function.
The following crew safety critical functions will be considered care-
fully in any subsequent hardware evaluation:
1. Inability to escape from booster explosion.
Z. Inability to compensate for booster thrust misalignment.
3. Inability to jettison booster.
, Loss of all or part of environment and life support functional
control, of oxygen concentration, temperature level, pressure
level, and atmospheric contamination.
5. Inability to orient spacecraft.
. Inability to provide trajectory connections from thrust misalign-
ment or loss.
7. Failure to de-spin.
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8. Loss of individual environment control during EVA.
9. Misapplicatio n of retro thrust.
PHASE 3.6 PERFORM TRANSPLANETARY INJECTION
3. 6. 1 Perform Navigational Operations - Completely redundant with the
ground computer/tracking operation.
3.6. I. 1 Perform Stability and Control Functions - Stability control is a
prerequisite for transplanetary injection orientation and reentry. Much
internal redundancy is possible.
3.6. Z Perform Guidance Functions for Injection - Peculiar to spacecraft
operations, e.g., pointing spacecraft in right direction.
3.6.3 Perform Countdown Operations for Injection - Although there is a
launch window, it should not be so tight that the mission would be aborted at
any failure. This must be in parallel with the possibility of repair of any
failure in time to enter the launch window.
3.6.4 Perform Crew and System Status Monitoring - Crew safety is not
affected by the monitoring instrumentation; mission success is affected by
aborts when instruments give a poor reading. Policy should be to use com-
plementary instrumentation for all critical functions and perhaps all mission
success functions as well.
Measurements anticipatory of a critical item failure could cause crew loss
on failure to detect a failure, but this constitutes at least two failures; and
with complementary instrumentation, more than two. This function is in
parallel with the correct functioning of the equipment.
3.6. 4. 1 Completion of Status Check - Mission success items, not crew
safety. Must be performed before proceeding.
3.6. 5 Apply Earth Control Guidance and Navigation Correction Data -
Redundant with data generation within the spacecraft.
3. 6.6 Initiate Injection Propulsion (Booster) - Complicated process controlled
entirely within the spacecraft. Critical failure modes are explosion and
severe thrust misalignment.
3.6.7 Perform Injection Control and Monitoring Functions - These monitoring
functions are in parallel with correct equipment operation. During firing, the
procedure should be sufficiently automatic that personal control need only be
exercised when failure has occurred. Critical failure modes are explosion
and severe thrust misalignment.
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3.6. 7. 1 Decision to Proceed - The spacecraft captain must look at all opera-
tions and consciously decide to go on. This is the last opportunity to return
to Earth in a short time abort.
3.6. 8 Terminate Injection Propulsion (Booster) - Automatic on achievement
of sufficient AV. This could be a difficult operation because of thrust varia-
tions on multiple boosters or the necessity to cool the engine after main thrust
is over. Critical failure modes: (1) explosion, (Z) severe thrust misalign-
ment, (3) expulsion of all H Z before cooling reactor.
3.6. 9 Provide I.U. Trajectory Information from Booster - This could be
extensive or minimal depending on spacecraft philosophy. If boosters are
standard modules, they may not contain any guidance equipment; or special
gyros may be included to save time on the spacecraft guidance gyros.
3.6. 9. 1 Jettison Booster - Critical function. Send to solar orbit.
3.6. l0 Provide Earth/Spacecraft Communications - Desirable but unneces-
sary. Communication is desirable (1) to assist in failure diagnosis, (Z) for
psychological extension of the astronaut's mental environment, (3) for trans-
mission of experiment results, and (4) for backup guidance data, etc.
3.6. ii Provide Environment andLife Support Functions for Crew - Obviously
critical to maintain crew functioning and, ultimately, life.
Functions That Apply to More Than One Phase
4. Perform MSFM Ground Tracking and Control Function - Again, desirable
as backup for several functions, but not critical in itself.
2.0 Perform Abort Operations (As Required) - On a standby basis after a
critical failure.
Series Functions
Mission Success Crew Safety
3.6 Perform Transplanetary Injec-
tion Functions
3. 6. 2 Perform Guidance Functions
Peculiar to Spacecraft
3. (). 3 Perform Countdown Opera-
tions. (Including Holds, Repair,
and Restart)
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Series Functions (Cont)
Mission Success
3.6.4 Critical Measurement
Success
3.6.4. 1 Completion of Status Check.
(Including Command Decisions to
Proceed Without a Full Check.)
3. 6. 6 Initiate Injection Propulsion
3.6.6. 1 CriticalInjection
Propulsion Operational Modes
3.6.7 Injection Propulsion. (Includ-
ing possible human actions to repair
or compensate for failures.)
3.6.7. 1 Decision to Proceed
3.6.7. Z Critical Injection Pro-
pulsion Operational Modes.
3. 6.8 Terminate Injection
Propulsion
3.6.8. 1 Critical Injection Pro-
pulsion Operational Modes
3.6.9. 1 Jettison Booster
3.6. 11 Provide Environment and
Life Support
3.6. 1. 1 Perform Stability and
Control Functions
Crew Safety
3.6.6. 1 For explosion failure. For
severe thrust misalignment.
3. 6.7. Z For explosion failure. For
severe thrust misalignment.
3.6.8. 1 For explosion failure. For
severe thrust misalignment. Con-
tinuing until all H Z is exhausted (no
reactor cooling).
3. 6. 9. 1 Depends on design; e. g. ,
interferes with midcourse connec-
tion thrust, overheats after shut-
down (nuclear incident), etc.
3.6. 1 1 No Oxygen
No Temperature Control
No Pressure Control
No Ridding of Gaseous Diluents
3.6. 1. 1 Inability to orient for
reentry retro.
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PHASE 3. 7 PERFORM TRANSPLANETARY LEG OPERATIONS
3. 7. 1 Determine Trajectory Parameters - Spacecraft guidance for early
correction is redundant with ground tracking and communication.
3. 7. Z Compare Trajectory Data with Earth Computed Data - Backup
operation.
3. 7. 3 Apply AV Correction - Once commenced, it is important to apply
correct amount and direction; but corrections can be made after an error.
In fact, early correction may not be necessary; it corrects for possible
inaccuracy in injection guidance. Criticality depends on spacecraft configu-
ration. Is there enough propellant to correct later on for a missed early
correction? Can the AV be applied at any time during an extended time
period? Methods should be developed which continually compute the direction
and duration of thrust so that any hold in correction initiation will not jeop-
ardize the mission, and it is important to hold initiation until all factors are
correct since, within limits, it should be less degrading to wait a short time
than to make two corrections. Corrections should be made only when guid-
ance shows a clear requirement, not within the error cone (of specified
accuracy, e. g. , 3(y). Theoretically, continuous correction would require
less propellant expenditure if corrections were always made in the right
direction; but this condition cannot be assured. Corollary corrections
should increase in frequency nearer the target since errors become more
easily detectable.
3. 7. 4 Recalculate Trajectory Parameters - Spacecraft guidance for mid-
course correction should still be redundant with ground tracking and
c on_n_unication.
3. 7. 5 Completion of a Complete Spacecraft Checkout - For crew safety,
checkout is always in parallel with the successful operation of the equipment.
In this case, completion of the checkout is not critical for mission success.
It is simply desirable to know the status. Changing the place of checkout so
that it follows artificial gravity maneuvers was done because (I) no abort is
possible if a problem exists; (Z) a checkout is scheduled only a short time
before; and (3) entering artificial gravity as soon as possible is desirable
since the astronauts have more time to make a complete check.
3. 7. 6 Prepare for the Artificial Gravity Mode - Only spacecraft personnel
can do this, but at a non-emergency pace. The possibility that a hold can be
made for a repair is good.
3. 7. 7 Extend Spacecraft, Achieve One-Third Gravity, and Stabilize - This
is a most difficult maneuver when two masses are on the ends of a string
(bolas). The maneuver is clearly necessary for mission success since
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excessive debilitation of astronauts is likely if zero g is maintained through-
out the flight. However, crew safety--getting back alive--may not be affected;
i.e., the return trajectory and propulsion can be controlled from the ground,
and the astronauts will be required to perform extra physical exercises. It
may be desirable to provide an alternate extension means for redundancy.
3. 7.8 Transplanetary Coast (First Phase) Used to denote passage of time
only. When specific activities are planned, they will be inserted.
3. 7. 9 Accept and Apply Earth Computed Trajectory Data - Backup operation
to spacecraft guidance.
3.7. 10 Determine the Need for Trajectory Correction - Decision is made in
spacecraft on basis of ground and spacecraft data. However, since the
ground crew is capable of making this decision also, internal redundancy
exists.
3.7. 11 Retract Spacecraft and Return to Zero g Mode - This is a most diffi-
cult and critical maneuver, vital to mission success. When in the artificial
gravity mode, it is necessary for crew safety. Abort possibilities exist,
depending on the configuration, e.g., mid-course correction propulsion and
the reentry capsule escape from the whirling system.
3.7. 1Z Apply _V for Mid-Course Correction - See 3.7.3.
3. 7. 13 Recalculate Trajectory Parameters - See 3.7. 4.
3.7. 14 Same as 3. 7.6.
3.7. 15 Same as 3. 7.7.
3. 7. 16 Same as 3. 7.8 for second phase.
3.7. 17 Same as 3.7.9.
3. 7. 18 Perform Interplanetary Experiment Program - Each experiment can
be considered a part of the mission success, but much time can be spent
setting them up and repairing when necessary.
Functions that Apply to More Than One Phase
3.7. 1. 1 Perform Stability and Control Functions - Every zero g mode must
activate the stability control system (RCS), which is inactive during the zero
g mode. The RCS may even be called on to start and stop the rotation for
artificial gravity. Alot of redundancy can be justified since this system is
critical for mission success and crew safety.
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4. X.X. See 3.6.
3.6.4 See 3.6.
available.
3.6.10 See 3.6.
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Vital to mission success only when an abort mode is
3.6. Ii See 3.6.
Series Functions
Mission Success Crew Safety
3. 7. I. 1 Perform Stability and
Control Functions
3.7.3 Apply AV Correction
3. 7. 6 Prepare for the Artificial
Gravity Mode
3. 7. 7 Extend Spacecraft, Achieve
One-Third Gravity, and Stabilize
3. 7. 11 Retract Spacecraft and
Return to Zero g Mode
3. 7. 18 Perform Interplanetary
Experiment Program
3.7.8
Phase)
Transplanetary Coast (First
3. 7. 16 Transplanetary Coast
(Second Phase)
3. 7. I. 1 Inability to orient for AV
corrections.
3. 7.3 Inability to correct velocity
and direction; the reentry window
therefore missed.
3. 7. ii Continue to spin without
ability to correct trajectory for
reentry.
3.6.11 See 3.6.
3. 7. 8 The spacecraft must go
through this time period success-
fully; however, when specific tasks
are determined, they will be
inserted.
3.7. 16 See 3.7.8.
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PHASE 3.8 PERFORM PLANETARY APPROACH OPERATIONS
3.8. 1 Prepare to Return to Zero g Mode - This intermediate step is unnec-
essary since 3. 7. ii included both preparation for and completion of the
return to zero g.
3. 8. P_ Accept and Insert Earth-Computed Trajectory Data - This now is a
courtesy backup, because the proximity of the planet and vast distance from
earth preclude accurate guidance.
3. 8. 3 Return to Zero g Mode - See 3. 7.6 and 3. 7. 7.
3. 8. 4 Perform Spacecraft Stability Functions - See 3.7. I. i.
3.8. 5 Calculate Trajectory Change Required and AV - Can be considered
redundant with Earth-based trackin'g only in a gross sense. Although still
shown in parallel, for crew safety, the probability of success of the Earth
tracking is very low. "This can really be considered in series for mission
success and redundant for crew safety.
3.8.6 Apply AV Correction - See 3. 7.3.
3.8. 7 Recalculate Trajectory - See 3.8. 5.
3.8. 8 Continue Planetary Approach Coast - Need be used only to designate
passage of time. Should be replaced by actual functions covering the time
period.
4. X.X. See 3.6.
3.6.4 See 3.6.
3.6.10 See 3.6.
3.6.11 See 3.6.
Series Functions
Mission Success Crew Safety
3.8. 3 Return to Zero g Mode
3.8. 4 Perform Spacecraft
Stability Functions
3.8.3 See 3.7. II.
3.8.4 See 3.7.1. I.
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3. 8. 5 Calculate Trajectory Change
Required and AV
3. 8.6 Apply AV Correction
3. 6. II Provide Environmental and
Life Support Functions
Series Functions (Cont)
Mission Success
3.8.6
3.6.11
Crew Safety
PHASE 3. 9 PERFORM PLANETARY ENCOUNTER OPERATIONS
3. 9. 1 Prepare Encounter Support Systems - Systems on the spacecraft which
support the experiments are as follows: communication with excursion craft,
tracking and guidance of excursion craft, electrical power within the space-
craft, temperature control, location brackets, and instrumentation. Ideally,
these could be accomplished automatically; but practically, some adjustments,
placements, and measurements will be accomplished by astronauts. All of
these myriad individual items are required for complete mission success,
but they can be accomplished over a relatively long time period.
3. 9. Z Perform Spacecraft Attitude Control Function - See 3.7. I. I.
3. 9. 3 Prepare Planetary Scientific Equipment - Work on the experimental
equipment itself may require adjustment, locating (inside and outside space-
craft), calibration of instruments in place, and construction of final form.
The only time crew safety is involved is with possible crew loss during
required EVA on suit or tether failure.
3. 9. 4 Initiate Optical Sensor Functions - Specialized actions for mission
success.
3. 9. 5 Perform Lander Probe Deployment Functions - Specialized actions
for mission success.
3. 9.6 Initiate Photographic Sensor Functions - Specialized actions for
mission success.
3. 9. 7 Confirm Lander Probe Trajectory - Tracking of lander probe -
mission success.
3. 9. 8 Establish Communications with Lander Probe - Radio contact with
lander probe - mission success.
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3.9. 9 Perform Lander Probe Tracking and Control Functions - Specialized
control functions for lander probe - mission success.
3.9. i0 Perform Lander Probe Data Storage and Relay Function - Special
mission success functions.
3.9. ii Perform Orbital Probe Insertion(s) Function - Special mission
success actions.
3.9. 12 Perform Orbital Probe Tracking and Control Functions - Special
mission success actions.
3. 9. IZ. 1 Confirm Orbital Probe Trajectory - Special mission success
actions.
3.9. 13 Establish Orbital Probe to Spacecraft Communication - Special
mission success actions.
3. 9. 14 Perform Orbital Probe Data Storage and Relay Function - Special
mission success actions.
3. 9. 15 Perform Encounter Experiments - Special mission success actions.
3.9. 16 Relay Data to Earth Control - Much depends on the spacecraft con-
figuration for mission success requirements. For minimum data storage in
spacecraft, relay of data may be necessary to return all experiment informa-
tion. For complete mission success, relay must therefore occur. Design
requirement should be more liberal with data storage space. Data relay
should be used as the preferred means, data storage as an alternate,
redundant means. Even if every other point is retained, sufficient data
storage should be provided for a minimum mission success.
3.9. 17 Terminate Planetary Encounter Experiments - Many nonautomatic,
mission success actions.
3.9. 17. i Summarize Data in Transmittal Form - The voluminous data
obtained from the experiments would glut available communication channels
and tax the power level. The astronauts should review preliminary readout
data and transmit summaries only as the first result. Later, as the space-
craft approaches Earth, more of the data can be sent at reduced power and
with greater clarity.
3.9. 17. Z Store Data - Sufficient storage capacity should be provided on the
spacecraft for return of all required mission success information. This is
in parallel with relay data.
Functions that Apply to More than One Phase
4. X.X. See 3.6. Can be omitted from this phase since no trajectory
corrections are expected.
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3.6.4 See 3.6
3. 6. 10 See 3,6.
3.6.11 See 3.6.
Series Functions
Mission Success Crew Safety
3. 9, 1 Prepare Encounter Support Systems
3. 9. Z Perform Spacecraft Attitude Control
Function
3. 9.3 Prepare Planetary Scientific Equipment
3.9.4 Initiate Optical Sensor Functions
3.9. 5 Perform Lander Probe Deployment
Functions
Initiate Photographic Sensor Functions
Confirm Lander Probe Trajectory
Establish Communications With Lander
3.9.6
3.9.7
3.9.8
Probe
3. 9.9 Perform Lander Probe Tracking and
Control Functions
3. 9. 10 Perform Lander Probe Data Storage and
R L'lay Function
3. 9. 11 Perform Orbital Probe Insertion
3. 9. 12 Perform Orbital Probe Tracking and
Control Functions
3. 9. 12. l Confirm Orbital Probe Trajectory
3. 9. 13 Establish Orbital Probe to Spacecraft
Communication
3.9. 14 Perform Orbital Probe Data Storage and
Relay Function
3. 9. 15 Perform Encounter Experiments
3. 9. 17 Terminate Planetary Encounter
Experiments
3. 9. 17. 1 SuHbnJariz(. Data in Transmittal Form
Functions that Apply to More than One I_l_ase
3.6. ll
3.9.2 See 3.7.1.1.
3. 9.3 For EVA suit and tether failure.
Pr()vide I':nvironm(.ntal and Life Support Functions - See 3.0.
- 107-
SID 67-478-2
Z
o
[.
Z
o
Z
a
_<
d
Z
0
_Z
(J
n,
Lu
:E
<{
I
n,
0
Z
0
IE
L/1
i/1
iii
U
U
Z
0
£0
..... ,i
l'!
w ,I il•
! ! I!
l.I !
p
r
I
i
) I
i
'1
C3 -
I _Z -Z
<0
o,,U,
U_3
>-
I--
iii
ii
I.U
P/
U
I
co
°i
'i "Ili'
i
<,__!
_i__ ,.
oi:;
U t'_ 1,.i 1
i _ll
I
I il
F-'-I
I
--ll
" "_ll
L_U
-!
o
u
E:
o
•,_ 0
-r_
4 ,
I
B
¢',1
I
co
I
p.-
,,D
A
H
NORTH AMERICAN AVIATION, INC. SPACE and INFORI_IATION SYSTEMS DIVISION
PHASE 3. 10
3.10.1
3.10.2
3.10.3
3.10.4
3.10.5
PERFORM TRANSEARTH OPERATIONS
Determine Trajectory Parameters - See 3. 8. 5.
Compare Trajectory Data with Earth Computer Data - See 3.8. 2.
Apply AV Correction - See 3.7.3.
Recalculate Trajectory Parameters - See 3. i0. i.
Perform a Special Spacecraft Status Check - After all the planetary
encounter experiments are completed and the spacecraft is in a state of
artificial gravity, a complete check will apprise the astronauts of the condi-
tion of the spacecraft. This is the longest portion of the trip, and the craft
must be maintained carefully. The check is still in parallel with successful
operation of the equipment and can be made over a long period.
3.10.6
3. 10. 7
3. I0.8
Prepare for Artificial Gravity Mode - See 3. 7. 6.
Extend Spacecraft, Achieve One-Third g, and Stabilize - See 3. 7.7.
Transearth Coast (First Phase) - Passage of time only. Need
specific functions during this time period.
3. I0.9 Perform Transearth Experiment Program - Each experiment is
mission success.
3. I0. I0
3 I0. ii
3 I0. 12
3 I0. 13
3 I0. 14
3 10.15
3 I0. 16
3 10. 17
3. 10. 18
3. 10. 19
mission success actions.
Accept and Apply Earth Computed Trajectory Data - See 3.7.9.
Determine Need for Trajectory Correction - See 3. 7. I0.
Retract Spacecraft and Return to Zero g Mode - See 3. 7. II.
Apply AV for Midcourse Correction - See 3. 7.3.
Recalculate Trajectory Parameters - See 3. 7.4.
Same as 3. I0.6.
Same as 3. I0.7.
Same as 3. I0. I0.
Initiate Earth Approach Experiment Program - Another set of
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Functions that Apply to More than One Phase
3. 9. Z Maintain Spacecraft Attitude Control Function - See 3.7. 1. 1.
4. X.X. See 3.6.
3.6.4 See 3.6.
3.6.10 See 3.6.
3.6.11 See 3.6.
Series Functions
Mission Success Crew Safety
3.10.3 See 3.7.3.3. 10.3 Apply AV Correction
3. 10.6 Prepare for ArtificialGravity Mode
3. 10. 7 Extend Spacecraft, Achieve One-Third g,
and Stabilize
3. 10.8 TransearthCoast (First Phase)
3. 10.9 Perform Transearth Experiment Program
3. 10. 12 Retract Spacecraft and Return to Zero g
Mode
3. I0. 13 Apply AV for Midcourse Correction
3.10.15 Same as 3.10.6
3.10. 16 Same as 3.10.7
3. 10. 17 Transearth Coast (Second Phase)
3. 10. 19 Initiate Earth Approach Experiment
Program
Functions that Apply to More than One Phase
3.9.2 Maintain Spacecraft Attitude Control
Function
3.6. 1 1 Provide Environment and Life Support
Functions for Crew
3. 10.8 Depends on what critical equipment is
provided for this phase of the mission.
3.10.12 See 3.7.11.
3.10.13 See 3.7.3.
3.9.2 See 3.7.1.1.
3.6.11 See 3.6.11.
PHASE 3. 11
3.11.1
3.11.2
3.11.3
3.11.4
PERFORM EARTH APPROACH OPERATIONS
Prepare to Return to Zero g Mode - See 3.8. 1.
Accept and Insert Earth-Computed Trajectory Data - Complete backup.
Return to Zero g Mode - See 3.7. 11.
Perform Spacecraft Attitude Control Functions - See 3. 7. 1. 1.
See 3.6.5.
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3. ii. 5 Determine Trajectory Change and AV Required - See 3.6. 1.
3. II.6 Apply AV Correction (as required) - See 3.7.3.
3. ii. 7 Continue Earth Approach Coast - Passage of time only. Specific
functions needed during this time period.
3. ii. 8 Terminate Experiment Program - Many mission success operations.
3. II. 9 Checkout and Maintain All Entry Critical Functions - Each function
should be delineated.
Functions Applying to More than One Phase
4. X.X. See 3.6.
3.6.4 See 3.6.
3.6. i0 See 3.6.
3.6. 11 See 3.6.
Series Functions
Mission Success Crew Safety
3. i1.6
3.11.7
Coast
3. ii. 3 Return to Zero g Mode
3. ii. 4 Perform Attitude Control
Functions
Apply AV Correction
Continue Earth Approach
3.11.8
Programs
Terminate Experiment
3.6. 11 Provide Environment and
T._f_ _.,., ,.-_ ,-_.., _-
3.11.3 See 3.7.11.
3.11.4 See 3.7.1. I.
3.11.6 See 3.7.3.
3. II. 7 This phase must be accom-
plished safely, but specific tasks
need to be determined.
3.6.11 See 3.6.
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PHASE 3. IZ PERFORM EARTH RETRO-OPERATIONS
3. IZ. 1 Determine Spacecraft Position and Velocity - Redundant with ground
based equipment.
3. 12.2 Accept and Insert Earth Computed Data - Backup data.
3. 12.3 Orient Spacecraft Along Earth Entry Vector - Critical maneuvers
for accurate alignment. Using the last propellant to slow the spacecraft as
much as possible is desirable, but applied in the wrong direction would send
the spacecraft out of the reentry corridor.
3. 1Z. 4 Apply Retro-Power to Burn-Out - This function increases the margin
for safe reentry by decreasing the spacecraft velocity, but it is not necessary
to either mission success or crew safety.
3. 12. 5 Reorient Spacecraft for Jettison Operation - A wide latitude exists
for orientation accuracy for jettison; in fact, jettison may not be necessary.
3. 12.6 Jettison Retro-Vehicle. For clean reentry and designed Use of the
heat shield, jettison of the retro-vehicle is desirable; however, the specific
design will dictate the exact method; e.g., (i) for a retro-vehicle which can
burn up and fall away from the spacecraft, retention of the retro vehicle
would increase the margin on the spacecraft heat shield, and (Z) for a space-
craft/retro-vehiclc orientation which would allow aerodynamic pull off
(higher retro-vehicle drag), the jettison operation is unnecessary. Here,
assume design cleverness So that jettison is not required.
3. 12. 7 Continue Coast to Earth Entry - Time only.
4. X.X. See 3.6.
3.6.4 See 3.6.
3.6.10 See 3.6.
3.6.11 See 3.6.
3. 7. I. 1 Perform Stability and Control Fu1_ctions - See 3. 7.
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Series Functions
Mission Success Crew Safety
3. 1Z. 7 Continue Coast to Earth 3. 12.7 Time only.
Entry
Functions Applying to More Than One Stage
3. 7. 1. 1 Perform Stability and
Control Function
3.6. 11 Provide Environmental and
Life Support Functions
3.7.1.1 See 3.7.
3.6.11
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